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Objective:   
The purpose of the A-RCI case study is to create a learning vehicle that 
describes spiral development through Open Systems Design, which then can be 
used for training and education of acquisition practitioners and future acquisition 
leaders.  The study considers such aspects as the PMO cultural environment, 
management techniques, open systems processes and controls, appropriate open 
systems metrics, resource impacts, business-case analysis (ROI), user and 
contractor participation, logistics planning, and required participant training. 
Summary:   
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI) is a success story in the use of 
Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)/Open Architecture (OA)—beginning with 
towed-array sonar on 688 Class Submarines and later encompassing all sonar 
systems on all attack submarines, some surface ship sonar applications and even 
aviation anti-submarine warfare.  The DoD has long considered Open Systems 
Design a “best practice” that should be used during system development.  However, 
as is often the case with best practices, the “lessons learned” have not been 
trumpeted widely across DoD acquisition organizations; distillation of the reasons for 
success in A-RCI has not occurred as yet, and the A-RCI techniques used in Open 
Systems Design are not widely known and applied in other program offices or taught 
in our institutional “schoolhouses.”  One way for interested parties to learn the 
practice of Open Systems Design successfully is through case study.  The purpose 
of this A-RCI case study is to create a learning vehicle for the application of 
MOSA/OA which then could be used for training and education of acquisition 
practitioners and future acquisition leaders.   
The study considers such aspects as the PMO cultural environment, 
management techniques, open systems processes and controls, appropriate open 
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 systems metrics, resource impacts, the interface with JCIDS, user and contractor 
participation, logistics planning, operational testing, and required participant training. 
DoD Key Technology Areas:  
Spiral Development, Advanced Processing Builds, Federated Software 
Systems, COTS Processors, Open Architecture, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS), Maintenance Free Operating Period, Reduction in 
Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC), System Acquisition; Technical Refresh.  
Keywords:   
Advanced Processing Builds, Modular Open Systems Approach, Software 
Acquisition, Software Development, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), System Lifecycle Cost (LCC), Spiral Acquisition, COTS 
Processors, Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP), Reduction in Total 
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 I. Executive Summary 
A. Background 
In the mid-1990s, the submarine community recognized the impending loss of 
U.S. technical superiority in submarine acoustics when foreign submarines began to 
exhibit major reduction in noise signature.  This resulted in a critical need to improve 
acoustic sensing systems to better identify and track foreign submarines.  Although 
new capability was critically needed, required resources were not available to 
support the developmental effort.  Critical need and the absence of sufficient funding 
constituted a crisis—demanding a revolutionary approach to achieve necessary 
technological improvement. 
B. A-RCI/APB Method 
The approach came to be called A-RCI—Acoustic Rapid COTS 
Insertion/Advanced Processing Build, which might be characterized in the following 
manner:   
• A-RCI used a modular open systems approach (MOSA).  Hardware and 
software development would progress on different paths and time lines.  
Key interfaces, standards, and protocols would be rigorously controlled as 
necessary to insure that different modules would work together.   
• Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology would be encouraged, and 
software reuse would be accomplished where feasible.   
• Innovative solutions would be sought from a deliberately broadened array 
of participants, including defense contractors, Government labs, 
academia, and small innovative businesses.   
• Technical performance would be demonstrated by testing against known 
(that is, operationally encountered and actually recorded) real-world 
performance data.   
• Technical decisions would be validated by peer review. 
-xv- 
 1. A-RCI/APB Benefits: 
• A-RCI yielded major performance and logistics improvements.  A-
RCI/APB regained acoustic superiority.  The maintenance burden of the 
A-RCI/APB systems was reduced through a new maintenance approach. 
• A-RCI/APB lifecycle cost was lower as a consequence of reduced cycle 
time, software reuse, transition to COTS processors, maintenance-free 
operating periods while deployed, reduced spare part requirements, and 
reduced maintenance training.  The lifecycle cost of A-RCI/APB has 
improved by nearly 5:1 over its predecessor system.  
• Software and hardware improvements could be implemented in a 
significantly reduced cycle time.  Software Advanced Processing Builds 
were developed annually and improved COTS processors acquired 
biannually.  These rates supported software updates of each submarine 
every two years and installation of new processors every four years. 
2. Obstacles: 
• Traditional end-to-end operational Testing (OT) was not a good fit for A-
RCI/APB.  The amount of OT became a major burden and an obstacle to 
the rapid op tempo of A-RCI/APB development. 
• The Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
reviews occurred at a slower pace than the A-RCI/APB op tempo.  The 
accommodation was to conduct annual JCIDS reviews for A-RCI/ APB, 
synchronized to sequential developmental spirals. 
• A-RCI/APB required less funding than would have been required using a 
traditional approach, but additionally, the funding profiles were shaped 
differently.  Continuous streams of RDT&E, Procurement, and Operations 
and Support accounts were required to support A-RCI. 
C. Conclusions 
The A-RCI/APB case study arrived at the following conclusions and 
recommendations. 
1. A-RCI has successfully applied MOSA, deriving major performance 
and logistics improvements. 
2. A-RCI demonstrated significant Total Ownership Cost or system 
Lifecycle Cost benefits. 
-xvi- 
 3. The A-RCI/APB example shows that MOSA can be applied 
successfully to a legacy system. 
omplished 
pment, in contrast to the longer 
duration needed for traditional systems development. 
5.  that 
s that should be evaluated to ensure appropriate 
joint reviews proceed without delaying the spiral development process. 
7. 
 
4. A-RCI/APB demonstrates that modular upgrades can be acc
very rapidly through spiral develo
A-RCI/APB experience suggests there are operational test issues
must be worked out. 
6. The op tempo of A-RCI/APB and the pace of JCIDS suggest possible 
synchronization issue
Funding implications of A-RCI need to be studied and understood.  
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 II. Background 
In the mid-1990s, the submarine community recognized the impending loss of 
U.S. technical superiority in submarine acoustics when foreign submarines began to 
exhibit major reduction in noise signature.  This resulted in a critical need to improve 
acoustic sensing systems to better recognize foreign submarines.  Although new 
capability was critically needed, required resources were not available to support the 
developmental effort.  Critical need and the absence of sufficient funding constituted 
a crisis—demanding a revolutionary approach to achieve necessary technological 
improvement. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  The “Crisis”—Slides Extracted from a Briefing by Dr. John 
Stapleton1
The approach came to be called A-RCI—Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion, 
which might be characterized in the following manner:   
• A-RCI uses modular open systems approach (MOSA).   
• Hardware and software would progress on different paths and time lines.   
• Key interfaces, standards, and protocols would be rigorously controlled as 
necessary to insure that different modules would work together.   
                                            
1 John Stapleton, Briefing: “APB/A-RCI Performance Driven Acquisition Reform for Undersea Warfare 
Superiority,” 26 September 2006, Slide 2. 
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 • Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products would be encouraged and 
software reuse would be accomplished where feasible.   
• Innovative solutions would be sought from a deliberately broadened array 
of participants, including defense contractors, Government labs, 
academia, and small businesses.   
• Technical performance would be demonstrated by testing against known 
(that is, operationally encountered and actually recorded) real-world 
performance data.   
• Technical decisions would be validated by peer review. 
The A-RCI approach demanded a new way of doing business.   
• Technical approaches must compete on a level playing field.   
• Contractual mechanisms must be established to address not only 
competition, but also cooperation among winning competitors once the 
selections were made.   
• Intellectual property rights and the sharing of information must be carefully 
structured to achieve fairness as well as practicality.   
• Rapid improvement must be brought to fielding via demanding schedules.   
• The Navy’s relationship with the prime contractor must change 
dramatically.   
• The submarine user community must be intimately involved, particularly 
preparing for and during at-sea testing. 
A-RCI took an integrated acoustic system that was difficult and time 
consuming to change and converted it into a federated system that could be 
upgraded in modules—that is, “plug and play.”  Such an approach was common in 
the private sector in the 1990s and even before.  Although the idea wasn’t new, the 
application of this approach to an existing warfighting system was daunting.  As a 
point of reference, in the mid-1990s, IBM was struggling with similar arguments 
about changing the way it did business; that is, should IBM stick with mainframe 
computers running proprietary programs, or should the company pursue the 
integration of “best of breed” software solutions that could interoperate with 
competitors’ software and run on computers manufactured by competitors of IBM?  
-2- 
 Even today, there are arguments within the DoD about whether federated systems 
are a sound approach for warfighting systems. 
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion progressed at a seemingly crushing pace, 
with software changes being implemented annually and hardware changes 
biannually.  A-RCI was a “poster child” for evolutionary acquisition—because the 
endpoint of the effort was not clearly defined, but there was a recognized need for 
improvement.   
The results of A-RCI were astounding cost reduction, dramatic improvement 
in technical performance, successful use of COTS hardware in a critical warfighting 
application, logistics support improvements, and an acquisition model that might 
have broad applicability across the DoD. 
Together with A-RCI’s amazing results came a series of questions that must 
be considered.   
• Was A-RCI a one-time success, providing a model that could not be re-
applied because of structural impediments within the DoD?   
• Was A-RCI leadership a unique alignment of extraordinary people that 
brought about change but is unlikely to be duplicated for future systems?   
• Is the DoD acquisition culture so rigid that it will stifle and kill future similar 
efforts?   
• Will cooperation among the user community support similar efforts in the 
future?   
• Are there such operational demands on the user community that they 
cannot tolerate the tempo of change that delivers new software or 
hardware technology annually or bi-annually?   
• Is modular open systems architecture scaleable to large warfighting 
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 III. Scope 
The scope of this research effort included several elements.  The first was to 
interview key participants in A-RCI and to gain their perspective on key contributors 
to the success of A-RCI.  Persons interviewed were asked to identify what they 
considered the unique A-RCI approaches and circumstances.  The second element 
included literature research related to acquisition processes and practices, modular 
open systems approach (MOSA)/open architecture (OA), and written documentation 
related to A-RCI. 
A. Definitions 
Definitions of Evolutionary Acquisition, Spiral Acquisition, Modular Open 
Systems Approach, Open Architecture Implementation, and Acoustic Rapid COTS 
Insertion provide a foundation on which to base a discussion about A-RCI. 
1. Evolutionary Acquisition:  
Evolutionary acquisition is a developmental approach to achieve useful 
increments of military capability without having to delay an entire acquisition while 
awaiting lagging technology or awaiting clarification of the entire required end-state 
(objective solution).  Evolutionary acquisition has recently become the preferred 
approach to satisfying operational needs, in an attempt to shorten acquisition cycles 
and place needed weapon systems into the hands of the military more quickly than 
in the past.2   
2. Spiral Development:  
Spiral Development is an evolutionary acquisition process used when a 
desired capability has been identified, but the end-state requirements are not known 
at program initiation.  Requirements are refined through demonstration, user 
                                            
2 Department of Defense, Instruction, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003, 
DoDI 5000.2, Paragraph 3.3. 
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 feedback, and risk management.  Each “spiral” provides the user an improved 
capability.3
3. Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA):  
Modular Open Systems Approach is the breaking of systems or systems of 
systems into functional components—hardware and software—and then designating 
and controlling the key interfaces, standards, and protocols.  Open standards are 
incorporated to ensure broadest compatibility.  Conformance with these 
requirements must be certified by developers.  MOSA is nurtured in an enabling 
environment. The result is “plug and play” components that can be separately 
updated or improved.4,5  MOSA contains five elements that shape its technical and 
business strategies; these elements, or principles, are described in the Program 
Manager’s Guide: A Modular Open System Approach (MOSA) to Acquisition, as 
follows.6
Principle 1.  Establish an Enabling Environment 
To adhere to this principle, the PM must establish supportive requirements, 
business practices, and technology development, acquisition, test and 
evaluation, and product support strategies needed for effective development 
of open systems. Assigning responsibility for MOSA implementation, ensuring 
appropriate experience and training on MOSA, continuing market research, 
and proactive identification and overcoming of barriers or obstacles that can 
potentially slow down or even, in some cases, undermine effective MOSA 
implementation are among the supportive practices needed for creating an 
enabling MOSA environment. 
Principle 2.  Employ Modular Design 
                                            
3 Ibid. 
4 Defense Acquisition University, online course: Naval Open Architecture, CLE012; available from 
https://learn.dau.mil/html/clc/Clc.jsp; accessed 2 August 2006. 
5 Rene G. Rendon, Using A Modular Open Systems Approach In Defense Acquisitions: Implications 
for The Contracting Process, Acquisition Research Sponsored Report Series, NPS-AM-06-010 
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 30 January 2006). 
6 Open Systems Joint Task Force, Program Manager’s Guide: A Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA) to Acquisition, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: author, September 2004). 
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 Partitioning a system appropriately during the design process to isolate 
functionality makes the system easier to develop, maintain, and modify or 
upgrade. Given a system designed for modularity, functions that change 
rapidly or evolve over time can be upgraded and changed with minor impact 
to the remainder of the system. This occurs when the design process starts 
with modularity and future evolution as an objective. Modular designs are 
characterized by the following: 
o Functionally partitioned into discrete, scalable, reusable 
modules consisting of isolated, self-contained functional 
elements 
o Rigorous use of disciplined definition of modular interfaces, to 
include object-oriented descriptions of module functionality 
o Designed for ease of change to achieve technology 
transparency and, to the largest extent possible, to make use of 
commonly used industry standards for key interfaces 
Principle 3.  Designate Key Interfaces 
The focus of MOSA is not on control and management of all the interfaces 
within and between systems. It will be very costly and perhaps impractical to 
manage hundreds and in some cases thousands of interfaces used within 
and among systems... MOSA manages the interfaces by grouping them into 
key and non-key interfaces. It distinguishes among interfaces that are 
between technologically stable and volatile modules, between highly reliable 
and more frequently failing modules, and between modules with least 
interoperability impact and those that pass vital interoperability information. 
Key interfaces should utilize open standards in order to produce the largest 
lifecycle cost benefits. 
Principle 4.  Use Open Standards 
Interface standards specify the physical, functional, and operational 
relationships between the various elements (hardware and software), to 
permit interchangeability, interconnection, compatibility and/or 
communication, and improve logistics support. The selection of the 
appropriate standards for system interfaces should be based on sound 
market research of available standards and the application of a disciplined 
systems engineering process. In order to take full advantage of modularity in 
design, interface standards must be well defined, mature, widely used, and 
readily available. In general, popular open standards yield the most benefit to 
the customer in terms of ease of future changes to the system and should be 
the standards of choice. However, there are situations where proprietary 
standards are the correct choice. Standards should be selected based on 
maturity, market acceptance, and allowance for future technology insertion. 
As a general rule, preference is given to the use of open interface standards 
first, the de facto interface standards second, and, finally, government and 
proprietary interface standards.  Open standards allow programs to leverage 
-7- 
 commercially funded or developed technologies and to take advantage of 
increased competition. They also allow faster upgrade of systems with less 
complexity and cost. Bottom line, systems can be fielded that are more 
affordable. 
Principle 5.  Certify conformance 
The program manager, in coordination with the user, should prepare 
validation and verification mechanisms such as conformance certification and 
test plans to ensure that the system and its component modules conform to 
the external and internal open interfaces—allowing plug-and-play of modules, 
net-centric information exchange, and re-configuration of mission capability in 
response to new threats and technologies. Open systems verification and 
validation must become an integral part of the overall organization change 
and configuration management processes. They should also ensure that the 
system components and selected commercial products avoid utilization of 
vendor-unique extensions to interface standards and can easily be 
substituted with similar components from competitive sources. 
 
4. Open Architecture Implementation:  
OPNAV has promulgated five OA reinforcing principles to support MOSA.7   
• Modular design and design disclosure to permit evolutionary design, 
technology insertion, competitive innovation, and alternative competitive 
approaches from multiple qualified sources. 
• Reusable application software, selected through open competition of “best 
of breed” candidates, reviewed by subject matter expert peers and based 
on data-driven analyses and experimentation to meet operational 
requirements.  Design disclosure must be made available for evolutionary 
improvement to all qualified sources. 
• Interoperable joint warfighting application and secure information 
exchange using common services (e.g., OA track manager) and 
information assurance as intrinsic design elements. 
• Lifecycle affordability including system design, development, delivery and 
support while mitigating COTS obsolescence by exploiting the Rapid 
                                            
7 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Warfare Requirements and Programs) (N6/N7), Requirement for 
Open Architecture (OA) Implementation (Washington, DC: author, 23 December 2005).  
-8- 
 Capability Insertion Process/Advanced Processor [sic] build (RCIP/APB) 
methodology. 
• Encouraging competition and collaboration through alternative solutions 
and sources. 
5. Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI):  
A-RCI is the spiral acquisition process applied to naval sonar systems.  The 
approach was to break the system into hardware and software modules and then 
make incremental improvements to the system through upgrading the various 
hardware and software components.  Developers were tightly linked to users, and 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
-10- 
 IV. Methodology 
A. Expert Interviews 
Development of this case study required discussions with persons who were 
intimately familiar with the A-RCI/APB processes and techniques, who were present 
as the A-RCI/APB initiative unfolded, and who understood the factors that 
contributed to its success. 
B. Literature Research  
Published information was used to document A-RCI outcomes, gain 
additional information on A-RCI/APB techniques and processes, and also to provide 
comparative background information.  Information collected through a literature 
review was arranged and analyzed to gain greater understanding of the A-RCI/APB 
experience.  
OSD and CJCS Regulatory Guidance.  There is a body of mandatory and 
discretionary guidance published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the DoD Components. Much of this 
material is on the AT&L Knowledge Sharing System website maintained by the 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) for the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), USD (AT&L).  The site provides current 
web-based materials that govern defense acquisition.  Defense acquisition policy 
and processes are addressed in the DoD 5000 series. 
Policy and practice on identification and documentation of user capabilities 
are addressed in the CJCS 3170 series. 
1. Other Published Materials:  
These include books, journals, periodicals, Government documents, reports, 
best practices, theses, studies, speeches, and briefings.  Much has been written on 
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 federated systems, Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-RCI), Modular Open Systems 
Approach (MOSA), and spiral acquisition. 
The Defense Acquisition University has developed and compiled educational 
materials on spiral development and MOSA best practices and has placed 
significant materials online.  Naval Open Architecture is a “Special Interest Area 
(SIA)” on the DAU Acquisition Community Connection website.  This SIA site 
provides Navy Guidance on open architecture and offers useful tools and 
perspective, much of it derived from A-RCI/APB experience.  The site provides a link 
to a self-paced learning module on Naval Open Architecture.  The Naval OA SIA is 
an excellent site for anyone interested in using a modular open system approach 
(MOSA) to hardware and software development.   
In addition to the DAU websites, there are other significant materials that are 
web accessible, including the Open Systems Joint Task Force website.8
Finally, considerable associated work has been commissioned by the 
Program Manager, Naval Open Architecture, Program Executive Office for 
Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS). 
                                            
8 Open Systems Joint Task Force, http://www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf/, Department of Defense, Accessed 28 
October 2006 
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 V. Data and Analysis 
A. The Crisis 
During the mid-1990s, it became apparent that the U.S. Navy had lost its 
acoustic superiority with the introduction of “quieting” technologies in other nations’ 
submarines.9  At the same time, the Navy’s priorities did not support funding a large 
developmental effort as would have been undertaken during the Cold War.  Not only 
was there insufficient funding, there was not time: developmental programs for 
warfighting systems stretched over ten or more years.  Improvement in the Navy’s 
acoustic capability presented an immediate need, unsupported by necessary 
funding. For submariners, this indeed was a crisis. 
B. The Strategy—Modular Open Systems Approach 
Navy developers had to try a new approach in response to their crisis.  Their 
answer was a modular open systems approach.  Federated systems were being 
developed and used widely in the private sector, but such an approach was not well 
understood for naval warfighting applications.  In retrospect, it might seem that the 
Navy was far behind commercial practice, but IBM was struggling through similar 
difficulties during a corporate restructuring at roughly the same time.  IBM’s strategic 
decisions were wrapped around some of the same concerns as A-RCI—the need to 
tap innovative, cost-efficient software applications sought by IBM’s customers, the 
need for software called “middleware” that applications could link to, and portability 
that would allow the software to be successfully operated on different hardware 
platforms.10
                                            
9 Richard Scott, “Open for Business: a New Model for Submarine Sonar,” Jane’s Navy International, 1 
March 2006. 
10 Louis V. Gerstner, Jr., Who Says Elephants Can’t Dance: Leading a Great Enterprise Through 
Dramatic Change (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003). 
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 As noted above, A-RCI was a response to a difficult situation at a time when 
other entities were wrestling with similar problems; however, that does not provide a 
sufficient rationale for writing a case study.  The A-RCI case study is worth relating 
because of the creative approaches taken by the submarine community.  The path 
that A-RCI took was multifaceted, and the approaches used are instructive for others 
considering MOSA.  The A-RCI effort was also daunting and, in many ways, 
inspiring.  
 
Figure 2.  Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)11
Legacy Systems such as an existing submarine sonar system circa 1990 
were not modular in their design.  Therefore, the early A-RCI effort required 
modularizing the sonar systems.  It is important to note that upgrade of a legacy 
system today might first require a business case analysis of whether modularization 
                                            
11 Open Systems Joint Task Force, Program Manager’s Guide: A Modular Open System Approach 
(MOSA) to Acquisition, Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: author, September 2004), 3. 
-14- 
 is feasible and the best approach.  For example, it might not make business sense 
to modularize a system whose replacement is entering its production and 
deployment phase. 
It was necessary, then, that the operational community (i.e., submarine 
operators) accept operational limitations while the system was being modularized.  
In modularization of A-RCI, it was necessary in the first APB for the user temporarily 
to accept an operational compromise (limiting the towed array sonar to a single 
display station) rather than to retain the freedom to use any of the several onboard 
displays for towed-array sonar or any of the other sonar systems. 
A-RCI’s pursuance of modularity led to separation of hardware and software 
for purposes of system improvement.  In this way, processors (the hardware) could 
be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and could be upgraded in consonance with the 
evolving commercial market.  The application software could be developed 
separately from the processors as long as the two would interoperate through use of 
transportable middleware.  The transportable middleware provided freedom to run 
application software on different processors.  All this was made possible through the 
control of key interfaces. 
System modularity enabled acquisition speed and focus, facilitating change to 
parts of the system where necessary, while leaving other components undisturbed.  
Although this aspect might sound almost trivial, modular systems are very different 
from fully integrated systems, in which small software changes may have major 
unexpected consequences in functions that are seemingly unrelated to the change. 
A requirement of MOSA is that the key interfaces must be carefully controlled.  
Although not trivial, the control of key interfaces is much easier than trying to 
understand and control all the internal interfaces within a large, fully integrated 
system.  This is especially applicable when integrating COTS components where 
some interfaces are not accessible and, therefore, not controllable. 
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 The A-RCI developmental process included a Build/Test/Build sequence.  For 
A-RCI, the developmental processes required a thorough demonstration of new 
technical capabilities to verify system improvement. New system capabilities were 
compared to previous system capabilities.  Additionally, new competing systems 
were compared one against another.  A-RCI was able to demonstrate system 
upgrades through the use of recorded operational events.  In this way, competing 
systems could be judged on their ability to process and display real data recorded 
during actual operational events.  Competing systems could be peer reviewed both 
realistically and “on a level playing field,” a situation that permitted competitive 
solutions to be judged solely on their merit. 
1. MOSA Business Strategy: 
A-RCI evolutionary strategy was that software changes would be 
accomplished annually through a developmental effort called Advanced Processing 
Builds (APBs), while COTS processors (the hardware) would be selected bi-
annually.  This was a highly demanding acquisition “op tempo.” 
MOSA encourages materiel developers to broaden communication links with 
users, contractors, and research labs in order to orchestrate both a competitive and 
collaborative effort. 
The competitive “playing field” had to be set up to attract innovative 
contractors who might be new to DoD contracting or might be intimidated by large 
prime contractors.  Competition had to focus on best ideas and best performance, 
not on politics and not on a preordained hierarchy of competitors—that is, a 
competitive and level playing field where the best technical solutions would “win.” 
Intellectual Property rights had to be respected, while at the same time, data 
and design information needed to be shared through mechanisms that were 
perceived as fair to competitors. A-RCI/APB processes and structures were required 
to facilitate the competitive, collaborative environment.  Intellectual property rights 
and the protection of proprietary data were addressed and controlled within the 
terms and conditions of the contract.  These legal issues had to be worked out “on 
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 the fly” during the A-RCI/APB effort.  Today, as a result of A-RCI and other MOSA 
efforts, there is helpful guidance that can be used in constructing contracts.  The 
Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook, Version 1, was published 7 July 2006, 
and provides suggested language that may be included in Sections C (i.e., in the 
Statement of Work), L, (Instructions to Offerors in the RFP) and M (Evaluation 
Factors in the RFP).12  For the reader not familiar with contracting, the RFP is a 
document typically used by Government contracting activities, inviting potential 
contractors to compete for work by submitting their proposals.  The RFP and the 
contract itself are arranged in accordance with the uniform contract format, which is 
described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
The A-RCI experience illustrated that open code and sharing of code enabled 
collaboration and enhanced the success of open systems design.  However, 
intellectual property rights and proprietary information must be respected.  Several 
practitioners associated with A-RCI/APB have made the point that intellectual 
property rights to portions of a warfighting system can hold the system hostage and 
prevent its continued improvement or reuse.  Prevailing thinking was that intellectual 
property rights should be made available as part of the price of entering into the 
competition.  In that way, code and design information could be shared with other 
participants to maximize progress.  This thinking is consistent with the NOA Contract 
Guidebook, which states, “The U.S. Government’s (hereinafter “Government”) ability 
to acquire at least Government Purpose Rights (GPR) to data and intellectual 
property and to minimize proprietary elements to the lowest component level is 
critical to this effort.”13
Each development “spiral” contained a highly competitive demonstration 
period, but collaboration and information sharing were expected.  In A-RCI/APB, the 
collaboration was characterized as “winning together.” 
                                            
12 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 7, Naval Open Architecture Contract 
Guidebook, Version 1 (Washington, DC: author, 7 July 2006). 
13 Ibid., 3. 
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 All A-RCI participants had to be acutely attuned to the schedule.  If 
competitors were unable to stay on schedule, they had to be left behind for that 
spiral.  Rigorous adherence to schedule—schedule discipline—was a necessity to 
meet promised customer delivery dates. 
C. Changing the Culture 
In reaching out to small innovative contractors, large contractors, academic 
labs, and Government activities, it was necessary in the case of A-RCI to change the 
nature of the “prime contractor.”  Retention of the prime contractor relationship would 
have been “business as usual” and not conducive to the participation by small 
innovative contractors and other non-traditional players.  The outcome was that the 
prime contractor was removed from the source selection process and became the 
“prime system integrator.”  The competing solutions were demonstrated using real-
world recorded sensor input, and the best solutions were selected through “peer 
review,” which is further described below.  A-RCI and APB upgrades—COTS 
processors and improved software algorithms—that successfully emerged from 
Build/Test/Build were handed over to the prime system integrator for integration and 
installation aboard submarines. 
 
Figure 3.  Advanced Processing Build Keys to Success14
                                            
14 Sonar Development Working Group (SDWG), 1998-99 Year in Review (Washington, DC: author, 
15 September 1999), 5. 
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 Peer Review of New Developments is recognized within the A-RCI/APB 
program as being one of the primary reasons for success (See Figure 3, above).  
The Navy took a page out of academia and adapted it to ensure a fair playing field 
for competitors that would ensure selection of the best alternatives for further 
development.  Peer review of Advance Processing Builds (APB) was conducted 
under the oversight of a Navy Program Manager and trusted advisors.  Oversight of 
Peer Review is uniquely challenging and, at least in the A-RCI/APB experience, the 
PM needed the following characteristics to be successful. 
1. Technically Competent 
Able to understand and work through the relevant technical issues. 
2. Proactive 
Involved in the process and focused on performance and product delivery.  
Able to work in a competitive environment with multi-organizational intrigues 
while participants jockeyed for position.  
3. Disciplined/Structured 
Willing to enforce professional and disciplined interaction among 
organizational entities to achieve an orderly and functional process. 
The peers included fleet (user) representatives, algorithm developers, and 
evaluators.  The program office, together with trusted advisors, selected persons 
with professional reputations for individual excellence, coupled with demonstrated 
ability to place Navy interests above organizational agendas.  Peer appointment was 
announced by e-mail and in meetings.  The announcements were made with 
sufficient formality or gravity that selection of peers was treated seriously, and such 
an appointment was sought after.   
1. Peer duration varied 
In some cases, peers have served from 1997 through the present (2006).  In 
other cases, peer duration was a year or two.  Fleet representatives typically 
have served until their change of assignment—generally one or two years.  
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 2. Peer funding differed according to circumstances 
Participants were funded by one or more of the participating program offices 
for the time they spent on the peer group.  This varied from ¼-time for 
meeting attendance and advice to full-time for peer group members who 
planned and conducted evaluations. 
3. Peer group structure designed for flexibility 
Different peer working groups were established. Two examples are the 
Automation Working Group and the Signal Processing Working Group (See 
1998-99 Peer Working Groups at the right side of Figure 4, below.)  Over 
time, the peer working group structure evolved as needs dictated.  In some 
cases working groups merged; in other cases, groups disbanded when their 
work was completed. 
Figure 4.  Sonar Development Working Group15
                                            
15 Sonar Development Working Group (SDWG), 1998-99 Year in Review, (Washington, DC: author, 
15 September 1999), 5.  
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 1. Documentation: 
A partial list of peer group documentation, which guided the peer groups and 
reported their progress, is provided for illustrative purposes as follows: 
• Advanced Processing Build Instruction, circa 2000. 
• Briefings (in viewgraph format) for new developers, summarizing “rules of 
the road.” 
• Year in Review reports. 
• “Snapshots” of metrics. 
• Peer group evaluation reports as APBs progressed through Steps 1-4. 
• Memoranda of Understanding of among various stakeholders. 
• Checklists to guide algorithm developers through the approval process. 
• Descriptions of open and closed data sets, against which the APBs would 
be tested. 
Other Peer Group documentation includes the following outside studies. 
• Air Force COTS study that reviewed A-RCI. 
• NDIA Study of APB/A-RCI. 
2. Systems Engineering: 
In the case of A-RCI/APB, a Systems Engineering Process (SEP) and 
structure were needed for guiding and synchronizing the work of the various players, 
accommodating a complex testing regimen, carefully controlling key interfaces, and 
incorporating standards to enable interoperability of hardware and software.  During 
development, software took shape under the direction of the NAVSEA’s Advanced 
Systems Technology Office (ASTO).  Software development was accomplished by 
small innovative contractors, academic research labs, and Government labs 
participating competitively and collaboratively. But these entities were not, as yet, 
organized under a prime contractor.  Later in the process, software development 
was consolidated under the direction of a software APB integrator.  Following a cycle 
of Build/Test/Build, hardware and software systems and components were handed-
off to the prime system integrator for assembly of the upgrade package and 
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 installation onto submarines.  All of this occurred at a rapid op tempo.  As ma
envisioned, no single contractor was perfectly positioned to accomplish SEP from 
beginning-to-end—as a prime contractor would have done in a traditional 
development.  Beyond the question of who should be responsible for the S
Engineering Process, end-to-end, over the entire developmental cycle, spiral 
development required repetitive developmental cycles—further complicating 






Figure 5.  System Development Model16
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16 C. E. Barron, “Naval Open Architecture Acquisition Approach (Draft): A Proven Acquisition Model 
for a National Security Systems Acquisition in an Environment Dominated by Commercial Off the 
Shelf Technologies” (Draft, August 2006), 15. 
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 Authority (or Technical Design Agent as it was called at the time). But, in this 
situation, NUWC, the applicable Warfare Center, was a competitor in the Adva
Processing Build and could not perform both functions without at least the 
perception of “tipping” the playing field in their own favor.  Responsibility for
managing the A-RCI/APB Systems Engineering Process eventually would be
handed off to the prime system integrator, Lockheed Martin; LM participated, 
therefore, as an important stakeholder throughout the SE IPT.  Once again, pr
final integration, Lockheed Martin could not manage the SEP without risk to the 
competitive level playing field; but, they needed to be involved to help insure a 
smooth transition during system integration and installation.  For future program
SEP responsibility might reside with the Government materiel developer (or be 
separately contracted) during testing and Peer Review before being handed off 
prime system integrator.  Needless to say, SEP management is potentially a serious 
risk area.  On one side of the balance, the Government PM office might not have the 
necessary staffing for managing SEP; on the other side, contracting out SEP might 










Figure 6.  The 4-Step Process17
3. The 4-Step Process: 
The rapid op-tempo of annual Advanced Processing Builds (APBs) was 
accomplished through a 4-Step Process, shown in Figure 6, above.  Further 
description of the 4-Step Process is extracted from the SDWG 1998-99 Year in 
Review Report to clarify the process18: 
Step 1.  Algorithm Survey:  
Step 1 is a survey of promising algorithms from the R&D community including 
6.2 and 6.3 activities, Office of Naval Research (ONR), Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Industry Independent Research and 
                                            
17 John Stapleton, Briefing: “APB/A-RCI Performance Driven Acquisition Reform for Undersea 
Warfare Superiority,” 26 September 2006, Slide 2. 
18 Sonar Development Working Group (SDWG), 1998-99 Year in Review, (Washington, DC: author, 
15 September 1999), 3-4. 
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 Development (IR&D), Broad Area Announcements (BAA’s) and related Navy 
programs such as the Submarine Security Program and the Integrated 
Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) community. The goal of Step 1 is to 
consider algorithms developed on other Navy funds and to determine their 
tactical importance, maturity, expected performance and computational 
resource requirement.  
Step 2.  Algorithm Testing:  
Step 2 is a test of relatively mature algorithms that promise to provide 
performance improvements to the fleet. They transition to Step 3 based on 
tested performance using common data sets and common metrics developed 
by a working group of technical principals in conjunction with the developers 
and fleet representatives. Utilizing real world data sets collected from U.S. 
submarine exercises and provided by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 
this testing provides a projection of algorithm performance using real world 
ocean noise and target signatures of interest. Experience has shown that 
testing on synthetic data does little to uncover problems or project 
performance for sonar algorithms in fleet use. The APB Step 2 process is 
unique in that developers submit algorithms for testing with the expectation of 
useful feedback from the testing process. Algorithm promotion to Step 3 is 
based on acceptable performance as determined by the cognizant Peer 
Review group.  
Step 3.  String Testing:  
Algorithms that demonstrate acceptable performance during Step 2 testing 
are passed to an integration agent for incorporation into an end-to-end sonar 
processing string on the IDP Multipurpose Processor (MPP) baseline. This 
processing string is called an APB. The Step 3 test, conducted by the Test, 
Evaluation and Assessment Support Group (TEASG) arm of the SDWG, 
[Groups descriptions are provided at Appendix 2.] provides an opportunity to 
independently test the APB string for compliance with performance 
requirements as well as fidelity with Step 2 performance results. It also serves 
to introduce fleet representatives to the new features in a string context and 
provide for fleet feedback. Similar to Step 2, real world data sets are used for 
this testing. Any identified issues resulting from the Step 3 testing are then 
forwarded to the integration agent for resolution prior to at-sea testing. 
Independent testing of the APB product is a critical step in the build-test-build 
process. It ensures readiness for at-sea testing and provides confidence to 
the community contributors that their ideas have been implemented properly.  
Step 4.  At-Sea Testing:  
Step 4 is the at-sea test for APB, again conducted by the TEASG. This is the 
most important phase of testing the algorithms prior to inclusion in the IDP 
baseline and provides information on how the fleet sonar team interacts with 
the APB in time for enhancement or corrective action. The test provides the 
opportunity to verify APB algorithmic performance and collect calibrated data 
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 for future use. The TEASG is also responsible for the evaluation and 
assessment of the test results as well as interpretation of algorithm and 
system-level results. (NOTE: The at-sea test conducted by the TEASG is not 
intended to serve as system certification. System certification is accomplished 
by the cognizant program office via separate testing after full integration of the 
APB into the baseline system.)  
At the completion of Step-4 testing, the APB is delivered to the program office 
for integration into the baseline system. To assist in the successful transition of APB 
improvements, a Systems Engineering Working Group is established during Step 3 
of the process (and continues through Step 4). This group ensures that issues 
related to the APB integration into the baseline sonar system are resolved as early 
as possible in the development cycle and that systems-level requirements are 
factored into the APB product. In Step 3, the group also initiates development of any 
required program office documentation such as specifications and change proposals 
to ensure the baseline system can readily incorporate the APB product.  
The APB and IDP partnership (via ARCI introduction) have demonstrated that 
the Navy can affordably develop advanced acoustic processing capabilities and 
annually transition these new capabilities to submarine platforms in quantity. 
4. User Participation: 
Involvement and stakeholder buy-in were major contributors to focusing and 
speeding the A-RCI/APB processes. The Submarine Tactical Requirements Group 
(STRG) set A-RCI/APB requirements that initiated each spiral.  Beyond that, user 
groups provided feedback in such areas as ease of operation, suitability of 
configuration, required training, and supportability, for example.  Users, of course, 
were heavily involved in at-sea testing and during submarine retrofit periods.  
Additionally, A-RCI user participants served as a communication link between 
developers and fleet users. The ensuing dialogue contributed substantially to sailor 
acceptance of A-RCI/APB in the fleet.   
Communications Forums.  Participation in essential dialogue involved many 
different forums and extended through each developmental sequence and into the 
next.  The importance of dialogue between users, materiel developers, and 
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 contractors cannot be overemphasized.  To provide a glimpse into the intensity of 
communication, the different integrated groups that assisted A-RCI/APB are 
described in Appendix 2, extracted from Chapter 2 of the Sonar Development 
Working Group (SDWG) 1998-1999 Year in Review report.19  
In summary, at least six facets combined to make the A-RCI culture change 
revolutionary within the DoD.  First was changing the nature of the prime contractor 
to a prime system integrator.  Second was gaining the participation of non-traditional 
technical participants who brought fresh, innovative ideas.  Third was the peer 
review process which leveled the competitive playing field, allowing good ideas to 
freely compete.  Fourth was the op tempo of the spirals—annual software Advanced 
Processing Builds and bi-annual processor refreshment.  Fifth was the intimate user 
participation.  Sixth was the intricate communications structure that supported A-
RCI/APB.  In the aggregate, this effort took heroic commitment by many different 
parties who historically were not “friendly” or cooperative.  How could this cultural 
change be catalyzed?  Part of the answer lay in process and contractual 
mechanisms.  Part also resulted from leadership, which is discussed below. 
D. Leadership 
Strong leadership is essential to proactive change.  Several of the A-RCI 
leadership aspects are as described below. 
Mandate.  Senior leaders provide pressure to change.  Without this “forcing 
function,” it is difficult for mid-level leaders/managers to achieve major change.  In 
the case of A-RCI, senior leaders told the acoustic systems office to “make 
something happen.”  At the same time, senior leadership provided top-cover—
protection from above—and empowered people to innovate.  There were 
undoubtedly elements of positive and negative motivation; participants both wanted 
to effect change and also had the sense that if they could not get the job done, they 
                                            
19 Sonar Development Working Group (SDWG), 1998-99 Year in Review (Washington, DC: author, 
15 September 1999), 8ff.  
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 would be replaced.  The “mandate” has to be balanced—in the case of A-RCI, senior 
leaders upheld such balance extraordinarily well, judging by the outcome. 
Mid-level Leadership.  A-RCI appeared to have excellent leaders in various 
positions who accepted the challenge and effected change.  Several of the A-RCI 
stakeholders interviewed clearly saw themselves as empowered agents of change; 
they expanded “the vision,” were not timid about making decisions, did not allow 
themselves to be defeated by bureaucratic obstacles, and motivated others to act.  It 
is quite apparent with A-RCI that senior leadership vision required capable leaders 
at different levels and in different organizations to “take charge.”  This is what led to 
A-RCI’s success. 
Mr. Bill Johnson, deputy program manager, PMS 425B, Submarine Combat 
Systems, outlined specific leadership actions along the following lines:20
• Set and maintain the vision.  Keep it simple and consistent. 
• Develop a strategy to implement the vision.  The A-RCI strategy 
incorporated a mixture of management, technical, and business aspects. 
• Develop and cultivate allies at all levels.  A-RCI included industry, 
Congressional members, senior leadership, a broad array of stakeholders 
within the developmental community, and fleet users. 
• Instill within the team a sense of empowerment and entrepreneurial spirit.  
A-RCI encouraged members of their team to think and act like leaders. 
• Set the expectations for excellence and the operational pace.  The A-RCI 
leadership team established aggressive goals, supported by rigorous 
processes that paced the developmental effort.   
In the aggregate, A-RCI worked because stakeholders, “formed a community 
that learned to be comfortable with change—not just technical things or even 
business processes.  The real change involved learning to work with new people 
                                            
20 William M. Johnson, “The A-RCI Process—Leadership and Management Principles,” Naval 
Engineers Journal 116 (Fall 2004): 102-3. 
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 from places we’d never dealt with before.”21  This is a reflection of a new leadership 
vision that was widely embraced by A-RCI participants. 
E. User Participation 
Participation and buy-in were major contributors to focusing and speeding the 
process.  The Submarine Tactical Requirements Group (STRG) was the user group 
that identified the required capability to be developed during each spiral.  This 
activity provided user focus to A-RCI.  The work of the STRG was very important to 
the user/developer dialogue; it set priorities and described to the developer 
community the relevant functional “shortfalls” or “opportunities.” 
Just as with other programs, there were many “voices” of the user.  A group 
of Senior and Master Chiefs provided invaluable human system integration (HSI) 
insights.  Their work provided feedback on APBs, processors, and displays.  They 
also challenged sonar training by testing the competency of sonar technicians; this 
testing led to enhanced training that improved the detection skills of these 
technicians.  The Senior and Master Chiefs thoroughly bought-in to A-RCI/APB 
improvements; for the first time, they could identify shortfalls and see resultant 
improvement by their next at-sea deployment.  The Chiefs played an important role 
in getting the fleet to support sonar upgrades.  They generated excitement in the 
fleet because system improvements could now arrive in time to be used by the 
sailors who had helped articulate and describe the needed improvements. 
Operational users were heavily involved in at-sea testing and during 
submarine retrofit periods.  This demanded system upgrade time, training time, and 
operator feedback. 
Support of A-RCI may have pushed some within the user community well 
beyond their comfort zone.  For example, modifications to training packages were 
very demanding, for trainers and students alike.  Additionally, upgrades in hardware 
                                            
21 William M. Johnson, personal e-Mail, 24 October 2006. 
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 and software placed extra burdens on submarine crews while in port.  At-sea testing 
of APBs and COTS hardware undoubtedly placed additional workload on submarine 
crews. 
F. Measurable Effects 
1. Technical Performance: 
Within eighteen months, A-RCI had provided a 7-fold increase in processing 
capability.  New algorithms provided clearer sonar information over longer 
engagement duration. 
• Mean operator success rate increased by a factor of 4. 
• Mean number of false alarm reduced by 40%. 
• Detection and classification time improved by 27 minutes. 
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Figure 7.  Performance Improvement Trend22
2. Reduced Lifecycle Cost 
The Navy is currently validating a historical cost comparison of A-RCI and its 
predecessor system. Preliminary results compiled from 10 years of data on both A-
RCI and its predecessor indicate that lifecycle cost has improved by nearly 5:1.  This 
comparison includes development, production, and maintenance costs. 
3. Cost Avoidance 
A-RCI provided many examples of cost savings/cost avoidance. 
a. Processor Cost 
Processing cost was reduced by a factor of 60, that is, 1/60th the previous 
processing cost which had resulted from specially developed processors. 23
                                            
22 William M. Johnson, Briefing: “Acoustics-Rapid COTS Insertion: A Changed Approach to 
Modernization,” Unpublished, Slide 18. 
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 b. Cost of Obsolescence  
Although not quantified, there were two aspects to ARCI’s obsolescence 
costs.  First was use of upgrade to avoid paying the high cost required to 
provide outdated, scarce components.  Second was harvesting obsolete 
components that had been removed from upgraded systems to support 
older systems that had not yet transitioned through upgrade.  
c. Cost of Post-Deployment Software Support (PDSS)   
Once modularized, post-deployment software support was less expensive.  
That is, software changes made to modular components were less 
complex (therefore, less expensive) than changes made to fully integrated 
systems.  The reason was that the changes must be carefully controlled at 
key interfaces, but there was less work required to deal with unexpected 
secondary effects.  The new application software was “plug and play,” with 
minor or no changes to the middleware, while most other (unaffected) 
application software was simply reused.  The portability of modular 
software to other systems and other platforms offered additional 
opportunity for PDSS cost savings or cost avoidance.  In the A-RCI 
example, application software used in submarines for towed-array sonar 
might also be used in spherical, hull, and high-frequency sonar systems.  
That same application software might further be used in (or possibly 
originate from) surface ship sonar or aircraft anti-submarine warfare 
applications.24
d. Other Logistics Support Costs  
Additional cost avoidance has accrued from logistics aspects of A-RCI, as 
shown below.25
o Inventory, valued at $600 million was converted to Just-in-Time 
contractor-provided support.  This initiative avoided $2 million in 
Navy Working Capital Funds. 
o Interactive multimedia instruction avoided $19 million. 
o Outfitting spares reduction avoided $3 million. 
                                                                                                                                       
23 William M. Johnson, “The A-RCI Process—Leadership and Management Principles,” Naval 
Engineers Journal 116 (Fall 2004): 101. 
24 Robert Zarnich, Briefing to Repository Workshop, “ASW Enterprise Open Architecture,” 21 
February 2006, Slides 19-23 incl. 
25 William M. Johnson, Briefing: “Acoustics-Rapid COTS Insertion: A Changed Approach to 
Modernization,” Unpublished, Slides 19-20. 
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 o Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs) avoided cost 
of more than $1 million. 
4. Logistics Impact 
A-RCI impacts on logistics were generally very positive. 
a. Integration 
In A-RCI/APB, systems development and logistics were integrated, 
obtaining several benefits.  Software technicians who responded to 
“trouble calls,” were also programmers—with the result that finding 
weaknesses in fielded software led to improvements in future Advanced 
Processing Builds.  Additionally, many of the software products were re-
used in Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (IETMs), training 
devices, and in training curriculums.  The system developer-logistician 
integration not only saved resources but also sped up logistics support—
which typically lags behind system introduction.  For A-RCI predecessors, 
“training lags of three years were not uncommon.  Today, [A-RCI/APB] 
training lag time is measured in days.”26
b. Training 
Modularized systems generically (and in the case of A-RCI) have the 
potential to reduce training burdens.  Training packages, or portions 
thereof, could potentially be re-used—not only across systems but across 
platforms. 
Sometimes offered as a criticism of A-RCI, operators and maintenance 
technicians needed frequent updates and, possibly, needed to be familiar with 
multiple generations of sonar systems.  However, as cumbersome as this seems, it 
may have been no more difficult than in the past.  Multiple generations of warfighting 
systems in service at the same time have been a fact of life for many years across 
the DoD.  Nevertheless, there seems little question that the rapid op tempo of A-RCI 
evolutions did present training challenges for operators and maintainers. 
c. Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP) 
One A-RCI initiative that was unforeseen at the outset was the creative 
employment of spare components in a way that reduced the need for 
                                            
26 William M. Johnson, personal e-mail, 24 October 2006. 
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 “open cabinet” repairs to sonar systems while on deployment.  MFOP 
became feasible because commercial processors take less space than 
their developmental predecessors.  It was found that sonar system spare 
components could be installed and fully powered in electronics cabinets, 
enabling them to be used in the event of a primary system malfunction.  
Then, if a system failure occurred in the operating system, that function 
could be switched to a “spare” module without physical access to the 
cabinet.  The necessary quantities of “plugged-in” spares were calculated 
that would achieve a high likelihood of continued operation.  As a result, 
“open cabinet” maintenance while underway has been virtually eliminated.  
MFOP has been a success in terms of quality of life because open-cabinet 
repair while underway was difficult to accomplish.  There also have been 
system readiness ramifications because operational availability has 
increased.  Finally, there have been maintenance-strategy implications, 
because now open-cabinet maintenance can be accomplished almost 
exclusively by contractor personnel after completion of a deployment.   
o A-RCI has demonstrated that system upgrades can include 
logistics focus.  Maintenance Free Operating Period (MFOP), 
described above, is an example of logistics focus.   
o As previously pointed out, modularization impacts LCC through 
less expensive replacement of obsolete hardware and software.   
o PDSS is simplified because software is re-used where possible.  
A-RCI has also shown that much of the necessary maintenance 
can be shifted to contractor logistics support (CLS); 
demonstration has shown that some software defects can be 
addressed remotely by CLS, using secure networks. 
o The A-RCI experience has shown that the character of sonar 
training has changed.  It has been re-focused to address 
performance weaknesses.  Some maintenance training has 
been reduced or eliminated as the result of MFOP, providing the 
potential for increased employment training. Upgraded training 
packages still are necessary, of course, to achieve full benefit of 
the system modifications.27   
                                            
27 Gibson Kerr, “COTS: We Can’t Afford to Do It Any Other Way,” US Naval Institute, Proceedings 
Vol. 132/10/1, no. 244 (October 2006): 69. 
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 G. Other Ramifications 
1. Portability and Software Re-use 
The portability of modular software to other systems and other platforms 
offers additional opportunity for cost savings or cost avoidance.  In the A-RCI 
example, application software used in submarines for towed arrays has been re-
used in spherical, hull, and high-frequency sonar systems.  That same application 
software also has been, or potentially will be, used in surface ship applications and 
even in aircraft ASW applications.  In addition to the potential cost savings or 
avoidance in software development and the use of common processors, there is 
also an expected reduction is PDSS.   
2. Scalability 
One of the questions resulting from A-RCI is whether the modular open 
systems approach is applicable in larger, more complicated applications.  For 
example, is MOSA applicable to other submarine systems, surface ship 
systems, aircraft, system of systems like the Army’s Future Combat Systems, 
or even National Missile Defense?  Portions of this question have been 
answered already, as described below. 
3. Implementation 
Two warfighting systems, Virginia Class Submarine and E-2 Hawkeye 
Electronic Surveillance Aircraft have successfully implemented MOSA.   
• Virginia Class Submarine Non-propulsion Electronic Systems (NPES) 
have been developed successfully using MOSA.  This undertaking 
included 23 different sub-systems—including tactical control and weapons 
control—that form into a coherent warfare system of systems (SoS). 
• E-2 Hawkeye Aircraft, a legacy system, has been modularized and 
upgraded. 
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 Two of our most challenging warfighting systems, the Army’s Future Combat 
Systems (FCS) and National Missile Defense, seem to be good candidates for 
MOSA. 
• The FCS is a family of systems (FoS); it is expected to comprise 18 
different platforms—a mix of manned and unmanned, air and ground 
systems—plus a network that will link the platforms.  There will be 
modularization, system of systems (SoS) at the platform level. Insofar as 
the platforms are treated as a “family,” reuse of software modules may 
offer significant savings; if MOSA is feasible, significant savings or cost 
avoidance potentially would extend from development through 
sustainment.  MOSA seems to offer a useful technical and business 
strategy. 
• Similarly, National Missile Defense must be modularized to permit 
development of the many different sensors, weapons platforms, command 
and control functions, and communications links.  If feasible, MOSA 
seems an appropriate strategy for development, upgrade, and 
sustainment.  There may be constraints to MOSA; for example, within the 
command and control system, real-time intercept calculations might limit 
the extent of modular design.  However, TOC savings and a reduced 
logistics burden are worth pursuing.  The DoD 5000.1 requires developers 
to employ MOSA, if feasible, but recognizes potential scalability limitations 
in the use of MOSA.28 
4. Treatment of Obsolescence 
From a logistics perspective, one of the major benefits of open systems is the 
freedom to exercise the “plug and play” feature at such time as a module becomes 
obsolete and no longer able to be supported.  This is useful because all of our 
warfighting systems experience sustainment issues as soon as production has been 
completed.  In some cases, this occurs due to competitive pressure—e.g., off-shore 
competition.  In other cases, legal or environmental issues may motivate suppliers to 
stop producing—e.g., castings and forgings in the early 1970s, due to new 
                                            
28 Department of Defense, Directive, The Defense Acquisition System, DoD Directive 5000.1, May 12, 
2003, Encl. 1, para. 27, page 7. 
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 environmental law.  In yet other cases, vendors might leave a business due to other 
market pressures—e.g., a company’s capability to accomplish programming support 
for a warfighting system in a particular software language might change as the result 
of unrelated market pressures.  MOSA contributes flexibility to react to any of these 
examples.  A-RCI/APB is now seen as an example of the flexibility to act proactively.  
In the future, that same flexibility may be useful in response to component 
obsolescence.  
5. Comparison of Legacy versus New Systems 
Legacy warfighting systems that have converted to MOSA are in better 
competitive position for upgrade funding than those unable to become modularized.  
Stakeholders will gravitate to modularized systems and open systems architecture 
because of the likelihood of seeing results faster, with “more bang for the buck.”  
New warfighting systems may contribute to their own “undoing” by failing to fully 
embrace MOSA, thereby becoming uncompetitive for future funding in the process.  
Based on the A-RCI experience (along with Virginia Class Submarine technical 
refreshment strategies), future ship acquisitions would appear to demand that 
aggressive technical refreshment strategies be used in new ship construction; the 
intended result would be installation of the latest mature technologies onto the 
Navy’s newest warships, while minimizing the incidence of obsolete technologies at 
the time of a ship’s entry into the fleet. 
6. Financial Management 
A-RCI funding streams have changed from the widely recognized pattern of 
RDT&E, followed by Production, followed by O&M.  As spiral development 
continues, there is need for continued RDT&E funding, albeit at a reduced level, 
taking advantage of MOSA.  Processor and APB upgrades require a continuing 
stream of Procurement funding, but at a reduced level by taking advantage of 
COTS.  Finally, O&M funding supports sustainment, just as in the traditional case 
but at a reduced level, taking advantage of CLS efficiencies and reduced life-of-type 
buys and obsolescence cost. 
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 7. JCIDS 
Spiral Acquisition must be rooted in the JCIDS process to ensure proposed 
acquisitions address required capabilities, avoid unnecessary redundancy, and 
provide interoperability with other warfighting systems.  The JCIDS process requires 
reviews and approvals that are important, but also are time-consuming and may 
contribute to program delays.  There appears to be a risk that rapid op tempo spiral 
developments potentially may collide with slower-moving JCIDS processes, resulting 
in incomplete reviews, inadequate user direction, or program delay. 
8. Testing 
A-RCI testing included Developmental Testing in support of market survey, in 
development (Build/Test/Build), and at sea to ensure that upgraded modules 
performed correctly in the system of systems or family of systems.  New COTS 
hardware and Advanced Processing Builds (APB) get a thorough technical shakeout 
to ensure they work correctly.  However, the A-RCI experience demonstrated a 
structural impediment to completion of operational testing.  Operational Testing 
typically examines suitability and effectiveness of the warfighting system and is 
accomplished “end to end.”  Unfortunately, end-to-end testing is expensive and time-
consuming for an operational asset.  End-to-end operational testing has not 
synchronized well with the A-RCI/APB process as testing is time consuming, 
expensive and may not always be necessary with spiral upgrades.  End-to-end 
operational testing has its place, but possibly not in every spiral of an evolutionary 
development. 
In June 2005, COMOPTEVFOR published guidance and a framework for 
integrated testing—that is, combining operational testing (OT), developmental 
testing (DT), and contractor testing (CT).  The intent of this directive was to identify 
and resolve Critical Operational Issues (COIs) as early as possible and to use 
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 operational testing to confirm mission performance instead of conducting an “all 
encompassing system evaluation.”29   
H. Summary 
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion/Advanced Processing Build (A-RCI/APB) 
shows the promise of a modular open systems approach (MOSA).  A-RCI was a 
leader, finding its way when few rules and guidelines were available.  Today, there is 
a body of information showing the benefits of A-RCI.  Rules and guidelines have 
emerged to help guide other programs through MOSA; many of those guidelines are 
the result of the A-RCI experience.  Other programs’ successes, such as Virginia 
Class Non-Propulsion Electronic systems (NPES) and E-2 Hawkeye aircraft 
upgrade, suggest that A-RCI was not simply a one-time success.  In the aggregate, 
these several successful programs are an indication that other acquisition programs 
might use MOSA with similar benefits. The A-RCI experience indicates that some 
Acquisition processes need to be retooled to interface with and reap the advantages 
of rapid spiral development. 
                                            
29 Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, U.S. Navy, “Operational Test and Evaluation 
(OT&E) Framework and the Integrated Testing (IT) Methodology” (Norfolk,VA: author, 28 June 2005), 
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 VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. A-RCI/APB has successfully applied MOSA, deriving major 
performance and logistics improvements.   
The A-RCI program drastically changed its technical and business 
practices—embracing business and technical principles and disciplined 
processes that currently comprise the Modular Open Systems 
Approach.  The results were a series of substantial technical 
improvements, reduced cycle-times, transition to COTS processors, 
and software sharing across weapon platforms. 
2. A-RCI demonstrated significant Total Ownership Cost or system 
Lifecycle Cost benefits.   
The Navy is currently validating a historical cost comparison of A-RCI 
and its predecessor system. Preliminary results compiled from 10 
years of data on both A-RCI and its predecessor indicate that lifecycle 
cost has improved by nearly 5:1. 
3. The A-RCI/APB example shows that MOSA can be applied to a 
legacy system.   
A-RCI/APB was modularized by first separating software from 
hardware. The integrated software was further modularized into 
functionally partitioned software modules and transportable 
middleware.  MOSA includes feasibility assessment of open system 
solutions—an essential business and technical consideration when 
starting with a fully integrated legacy solution. 
4. A-RCI/APB demonstrates that modular upgrades can be 
accomplished very rapidly through spiral development, in 
contrast to traditional systems development.   
A-RCI/APB was able to produce an Advanced Processing Build 
annually and upgrade COTS processing hardware every two years.  
Implementations in the submarine fleet resulted in each submarine 
getting upgraded software at about two-year intervals and new COTS 
processors at approximately four-year intervals. 
5. A-RCI/APB experience suggests there are operational test issues 
that must be worked out.   
Operational testers have a bias for end-to-end testing, which is 
expensive and slow, but thorough.  Such an approach to testing does 
not fit well with rapid spiral development.  A-RCI/APB included at-sea 
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 testing on operational submarines, but this was not end-to-end testing 
in the traditional mold.  OPTEVFOR’s 2005 policy directive suggests 
that the Navy is trying to streamline OT to better fit rapid op tempo 
spiral development programs. 
6. The op tempo of A-RCI/APB and the pace of JCIDS suggest 
possible synchronization issues that should be evaluated to 
ensure that appropriate joint reviews proceed without delaying 
the spiral development process.   
A-RCI/APB spirals are receiving an annual JCIDS review.  Publication 
of a JCIDS supplement pertaining to rapid op tempo spiral 
developmental programs would be highly beneficial. 
7. Funding implications of A-RCI need to be studied and 
understood.   
Traditional funding profiles do not support the A-RCI example.  
Traditional funding entails three overlapping funding profiles of 
increasing size: RDT&E, Procurement, and the O&S accounts 
(primarily O&M and military personnel).  Annual increments of spiral 
development require continuous streams of RDT&E, Procurement, and 
the O&S accounts—smaller, more flat annual amounts, continuously, 
as long as the annual spirals continue.  
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 Appendix A.  Potential Template Opportunities for 
Support of Modular Open Systems Approach 
(Based on A-RCI/APB Experience) 
1. Technology Open Systems Strategy 
2. Business Modular Open Systems Approach 
3. Culture Changes Necessary to Support Modular Open Systems Approach 
4. Leadership Support Required at Critical Levels 
5. Users’ Participation 
6. Testing Interfaces that are Streamlined to Support Rapid Acquisition OPTEMPO 
7. JCIDS Interfaces 
8. Logistics—Sustainment Structures and Payoffs 
9. Training Impacts 
10. Upgrade Process/Implementation Strategy and Processes 
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 Appendix B. A-RCI/APB Supporting Organizations 
(Extracted from Sonar Development Working Group (SDWG), 1998-99 Year in 
Review) 
CHAPTER 2.  ORGANIZATION 
 
Figure 2-1. SDWG Organization  
In order to manage the APB Process and the transition of new algorithms for fleet use, an 
Integrated Product Team (IPT) structure has been adopted and is provided in Figure 2-1. 
However, it should be noted that the management, direction and decision-making 
responsibility for the process and content of the individual systems continue to reside with 
the cognizant Program Offices: PMS425 for in-service submarine sonar, PMS401 for the VA 
Class submarine sonar system, PMS411 for the SQQ-89(V) program, PMS500 for DD-21 
and PD-18 for the IUSS program. In concert with the Program Offices, ASTO has significant 
responsibility in delivering the APB technologies for insertion into the baseline sonar 
systems.  
Various working groups, chartered by the program offices, are chaired according to 
personnel expertise and provide a broad representational cross-section of the best and 
brightest from the fleet, Navy Laboratories, University Laboratories and industry.  
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 2.1 SDWG  
The SDWG, jointly chaired by Victor Gavin (PMS425), Kevin Collins of the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center Division Newport (NUWCDIVNPT) and Joe Grant (PMW-182), provides a 
monthly forum for discussion of topics, updates and issues related to the APB process. It 
provides a clearinghouse for communication across the working groups and a forum to brief 
recommendations and works in progress from the various working groups. Meetings are 
held monthly and agenda items are developed based on priorities established by the fleet 
and the sponsor (Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) N87) with inputs from the Program 
Offices and working group constituents.  
2.2 Advisory/Review Groups  
2.2.1 Technical Advisory Group (TAG)  
The TAG, an extension of the original SSTP including additional advisors of national repute 
and organizational leads from key laboratories, advises the Program Offices, the SDWG and 
the sponsor on all matters related to the APB process. Chaired by Jim Griffin (N875T), the 
TAG provides an additional check and balance to ensure integrity across the entire APB 
process described in Chapter 1. The TAG reviews issues such as progress toward the dB 
budget, plans for Step 3 and Step 4 APB testing, results of Step 2 algorithm testing and 
various other technical issues.  
2.2.2 Near Term Working Group (NTWG)  
A sister organization to the SDWG, the NTWG is chartered to coordinate the procurement, 
testing and assistance to the submarine Type Commanders (TYCOMs) for the shipboard 
installation of advanced augmentation bridge systems for fleet deployments. Chaired by 
LCDR Rutledge Webb, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), the NTWG 
provides recommendations and assessments to N87 with respect to the following:  
 Procurement and Support of acoustic and combat control augmentation systems 
required to improve submarine acoustic superiority and tactical control  
 Augmentation system installation configuration and support for fleet needs  
 APB functions, test and evaluation process  
 Planned improvements/upgrades to fleet acoustic and combat control systems  
The NTWG is responsible for migrating the APB-99 technology into the Automated Fleet 
Towed Array System (AFTAS) hardware suite under the AEP program described more fully 
in Chapter 3. The AEP is scheduled for fleet introduction in late 1999.  
2.2.3 Sensor Optimization IPT (SOIPT)  
The SOIPT is a senior level organization providing high-level management peer review to 
advanced development programs. Chaired by James Thompson (ASTO), the SOIPT assists 
in R&D program planning and provides recommendations for funding of future advanced 
development initiatives.  
2.2.4 Tactical Integration Advisory Group (TIAG)  
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 The TIAG is a forum of senior representatives established to monitor the future of tactical 
control initiatives. Chaired by CAPT Claude Barron (PMS401), the TIAG provides support 
and recommendations to the SDWG in defining requirements for APBs and their utility in 
improving tactical control.  
2.3 Functional Support Groups  
The Functional Support Groups carry out the essential tasks to support the transition of the 
APBs to the target program including end-to-end string testing in the laboratory and at-sea, 
predictions of the performance improvements of the processing and the development of 
laboratory and database infrastructure.  
2.3.1 Data Support Group (DataSG)  
The DataSG is responsible for coordinating data collection requests and identifying and 
providing data segments from relevant blue-on-blue and blue-on-orange encounters for 
controlled distribution. The DataSG provides open sets (signatures known prior to user 
review) to the R&D community and open and closed data sets (signatures revealed only 
during testing) to various SDWG groups including the Signal Processing Working Group 
(SPWG), the Automation Working Group (AWG) and the TEASG. The DataSG is chaired by 
Bob Amundson (ONI).  
2.3.2 Development Support Group (DevSG)  
The DevSG is responsible for defining and implementing the equipment suites required for 
the research, development and testing of the APBs. The DevSG is also chartered to support 
the rapid dissemination of approaches to industry and development of the Middleware 
Support/Certification Plan. Chaired by Rich Matis of NUWCDIVNPT, the DevSG includes 
representatives from ONI, NUWCDIVNPT, JHU/APL, Digital Systems Resources (DSR), 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL), and Naval Surface 
Warfare Center Crane Division (NSWCCD).  
2.3.3 Test, Evaluation, Assessment and Support Group (TEASG)  
The TEASG is responsible for providing independent test and evaluation for both in-lab 
(Step 3) and at-sea (Step 4) testing of the APBs. Chaired by Tom Stewart (JHU/APL), the 
TEASG is also responsible for managing evaluation-to-evaluation compatibility and 
providing a performance comparison with the baseline system. The TEASG is comprised of 
representatives from NUWCDIVNPT, JHU/APL, Applied Research Laboratory, University of 
Texas (ARL:UT), MITRE, DSR, ONI and Commander, Submarine Development Squadron 
12 (CSDS-12).  
At-sea testing is the principal focus of the APB test process, permitting live examination of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the new build and quantitative measurements of 
performance. Weaknesses can be addressed and mitigated during transition to IDP. In 
addition, at-sea testing provides the essential confidence required by the TYCOMs to 
endorse the use of the new processing for patrols and deployments. Well-constructed at-sea 
tests also provide important data collection opportunities for further R&D tasking. Laboratory 
testing provides the essential looks at diverse threat signatures and geometries that are 
unavailable in at sea blue-on-blue testing, adding an additional level of understanding and 
confidence in the algorithms. It also provides assurance to the community contributors that 
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 their algorithms have been implemented and perform properly. Finally, laboratory testing 
provides an early opportunity for crew familiarization and training with the new processing.  
In addition to testing of APBs, the TEASG oversees the continued measurement and 
assessment of fielded ARCI systems through the ARCI Engineering Measurement Program. 
The TEASG can then assess performance of the fielded system, compare the performance 
with that expected based on APB testing and feed back assessment results into 
development.  
2.3.4 Modeling and Prediction Support Group (MPSG)  
The MPSG provides analytical bounds on performance of the algorithms incorporated in an 
APB. It also provides for the development of models to adequately project, with meaningful 
metrics, the performance of the sonar system in areas of interest. The MPSG is chaired by 
Garry Jacyna (MITRE) and includes representatives from NUWCDIVNPT and JHU/APL.  
2.3.5 Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operator-Machine Interface (OMI) Support 
Group (COSG)  
The COSG defines the OMI (notional control and display schemes) and operational 
utilization of the processing algorithms developed by the SPWG and the AWG. The primary 
fleet voice for determining the priority of APB improvements in the areas of acoustic signal 
detection, system automation and tactical information management, the COSG also 
develops and conducts crew familiarization training for platforms receiving the APB system 
upgrades.  
The COSG is chaired by STSCM Terry Stuckart (CSDS-12) and is comprised principally of 
active duty senior enlisted personnel, civilian representatives from the program offices, 
system development contractors (Lockheed Martin Undersea Systems (LMUSS) and DSR), 
and ACINT experts from the fleet.  
2.3.6 Training IPT  
The Training IPT is responsible for the development of a process for a common training 
approach among the submarine operational, technical, training, and intelligence 
communities. Once this process is developed and approved, the Training IPT will oversee its 
implementation and provide periodic assessments to the program office with prioritized 
recommendations for APB changes and training improvements.  
Areas of focus for the process are the development of metrics, training of operators on 
system installations and upgrades, improving maintenance training and identification of 
potential system upgrades to enhance operator performance.  
The Training IPT is chaired by a PMS4252 representative and is comprised of 
representatives from CNO N872, CNO N879, the TYCOMs, NAVSEA 92L1, Chief of Naval 
Education and Training (CNET), ONI, JHU/APL, SOBT and LMUSS.  
2.4 Execution IPTs  
Execution IPTs are chartered to provide program direction and asset management for the 
Peer Review Working Groups. Although the Execution IPTs may merge over the next two 
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 years as the APB process stabilizes and cross-sensor fusion is addressed, the following 
provides a summary listing of the current Execution IPTs and their responsibilities.  
2.4.1 Towed Array Execution IPT  
Chaired by Bob Zarnich (ASTO), this IPT has responsibility for the delivery of towed array 
and hull array APB processing. The IPT composition is determined by ASTO and PMS425 
and currently includes representatives from PMS425, NUWCDIVNPT, the chairs of the Peer 
Review Working Groups and DSR, the towed array/hull array APB integration agent for 
APB-98 and APB-99.  
2.4.2 Sphere Array Execution IPT  
Co-chaired by George Zvara (NUWCDIVNPT) and Howard Taylor (LMUSS), this IPT has 
responsibility to manage the advanced development of improved sonar Spherical Array (SA) 
detection, classification and localization functionality. ASTO and PMS425 determine the IPT 
representatives. A merger of the Sphere Array Execution IPT with both the Towed Array 
Execution IPT and the High Frequency Execution IPT is planned in the near future to 
support a common Low Frequency (LF), Medium Frequency (MF) and High Frequency (HF) 
Execution IPT.  
2.4.3 Towed Array-Wet End Execution IPT  
Representatives from the Towed Array-Wet End Execution IPT have been monitoring the 
Navy’s efforts over the course of the past year to develop a common thin line array and/or 
common components for a thin line array to support the submarine, surface and IUSS 
communities. Chaired by Jean-Pierre Feuillet (PMS411), the Towed Array-Wet End 
Execution IPT will become more actively engaged in this effort in the near future once the 
initiative leaves the planning stages and is under contract.  
2.4.4 High Frequency Execution IPT  
The High Frequency Execution IPT maintains responsibility for the delivery of high 
frequency sail and chin processing for the HF APB-99 build and development of HF APB-01. 
The IPT, chaired by Jim Broughton (ASTO), consists of representatives from ASTO, 
PMS425, NUWCDIVNPT, ARL:UT and LMUSS. As stated previously, plans call for a future 
merger of the HF Execution IPT with the Towed Array and Sphere Array Execution IPTs.  
2.4.5 Active Classification Execution IPT  
Active Classification is fundamentally different than passive classification. Chaired by Jeff 
Jones (ASTO), the Active Classification IPT is examining technologies to improve the active 
classification process. Committee membership presently is comprised of NUWCDIVNPT, 
ASTO, and CSDS-12. The focus during 1998 and 1999 has been to examine the viability of 
transition of automation technology from the surface ship combatant community. These 
efforts are more fully detailed in Chapter 3.  
2.4.6 SQQ-89 Execution IPT  
The SQQ-89 Execution IPT, chaired by Jean-Pierre Feuillet (PMS411), was established in 
late 1998 under the joint PMS425/PMS411/PMS415 MOU described in Chapter 1. The 
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 focus of this IPT is on extending the application of a common acoustic processing system to 
surface ships. The IPT provides technical direction to the respective program offices for 
development of the Common Acoustic Processor for Surface Combatants (SURCAP). The 
IPT will be co-chaired by a PMS425 designated representative.  
2.4.7 IUSS Execution IPT  
Chartered in 1998, the IUSS Execution IPT is responsible for providing all technical direction 
for development of the NCAP and for managing the integration of the APB-developed NCAP 
components with other IUSS processing components. The IUSS Execution IPT is chaired by 
S. Lachtman (SPAWAR).  
2.5 Peer Review Groups  
The Peer Review Groups address the functional and technical issues required leading to the 
recommendations for improvements to the sensor processing. The groups provide 
recommendations to the Execution IPTs on R&D priorities, including tasking for each funded 
organization and provide independent test and evaluation of candidate algorithms. These 
working groups collectively survey, develop and test the algorithms and displays (Step 1 and 
Step 2 of the APB process) and monitor progress through Step 4. The Program Office leads 
of the Execution IPTs determine the chairs and membership of the Peer Groups, focusing 
on the talents, experience and capabilities of the individuals rather than organizational ties.  
2.5.1 Automation Working Group (AWG)  
The focus of the AWG is on algorithms intended to automate the use of data generated by 
the signal processor and available for display. This typically includes processing which 
replaces, assists or extends the traditionally operator-intensive functions (i.e., source 
detection and recognition, tracking, source correlation, classification and extraction of 
tactical information) and also may include source intercept and identification, echo steal, 
source localization and decision aids for vulnerability assessment and planning.  
Working with fleet representatives from CSDS-12 and the COSG, the AWG identifies and 
prioritizes automation needs that are most effective for fleet use. Following the four-step 
APB process, the AWG identifies candidate solutions for those needs by leveraging the best 
algorithms available throughout the R&D community. AWG members evaluate those 
algorithms for potential use, and recommend selected automation products for integration 
into the APB baseline. The AWG also develops effective concepts for interface, display and 
control of automation information, and encourages developers to work those key 
improvement areas. The AWG works with the SPWG and system developers to ensure that 
its recommendations properly account for processing performance and system sizing 
constraints.  
John Stapleton (JHU/APL) chairs the AWG which is comprised of representatives from 
MITRE, DSR, CSDS-12, LMUSS, MIT/LL and NUWCDIVNPT. Non-members can participate 
in open sessions of the AWG known as the Friends of AWG (FoAWG).  
2.5.2 Signal Processing Working Group (SPWG)  
The SPWG is responsible for the sonar signal processing which includes array processing, 
adaptive beamforming and range focusing as well as narrowband and broadband detection 
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 improvements. The SPWG is jointly chaired by Clark Penrod (ARL:UT) and Cliff Carter 
(NUWCDIVNPT). The SPWG includes representatives from LMUSS, ONI, Orincon, DSR, 
JHU/APL and CSDS-12. Similar to the AWG, non-members can participate in open sessions 
of the SPWG known as the Friends of the SPWG (FoSPWG).  
2.5.3 Parameter Estimation Working Group (PEWG)  
The PEWG addresses issues associated with extracting target and noise parameters from 
the array data. These include parameters for bearings and ranges as well as their rates, 
frequencies and Dopplers. The initial focus of the PEWG has been on the trackers and 
identifying the causes of their failures and the need to reinstate them. Both broadband and 
narrowband trackers have been examined. Art Baggeroer (MIT) chairs the PEWG which 
includes representatives from AET, George Mason University, MIT/LL, NUWCDIVNPT, 
SAIC and DARPA.  
2.5.4 High Frequency Peer Group (HFPG)  
The HFPG is responsible for initiating the APB process for the HF program (including 
establishing the criteria for and determining APB content) and for reviewing all hull-mounted 
active sonar improvements and recommendations. The HFPG is chaired by Larry Green 
(JHU/APL) and includes representatives from ARL:UT, NUWCDIVNPT, LMUSS, PMS425, 
JHU/APL, MITRE, Arctic Submarine Lab, EG&G, A&T, ASTO and ARL:PSU. The HFPG 
focuses on the following HF improvement areas:  
 Mine avoidance  
 Bottom mapping  
 Passive and Active Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)  
 Low Probability of Intercept Waveforms  
The peer group has covered all aspects of the HF APB including signal processing, 
automation (termed Computer-Aided Detection (CAD)), OMI, and test and evaluation.  
In addition, the HFPG community will begin participating as subgroups within the COSG, 
SPWG and AWG as part of the planned merger of the Towed Array, Sphere Array and HF 
Execution IPTs.  
2.5.5 Operator Feedback IPT (OFIPT)  
The OFIPT combines the efforts of the operational, technical, training and intelligence 
communities to establish feedback in the form of training and operational performance 
measurements. This includes a process to provide feedback to program offices and the 
training community on the submariner’s performance in the operation of the sonar system. 
The feedback will be used to enhance the effectiveness of improvements in sonar upgrades 
by determining where measurable improvements can be made through changes to the 
sonar training or system development processes.  
A primary goal of the OFIPT is to gain near-term improvements that will have an immediate 
payoff for improved sensor performance. To support this goal and develop an objective 
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 operator performance feedback process, Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOEs) must be established first in order to focus on those skills most 
effective for operators.  
This IPT, chaired by Tim Oliver (Booz-Allen), includes representatives from LMUSS, ONI, 
JHU/APL, NAVSEA 92L1 and the submarine TYCOMs. The OFIPT complements the AEMP 
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